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THE SOFT SPOT: HOW TO ATTACK THE PENTAGON
MARION ANDERSON
THE PUBLIC INTEREST RESEARCH GROUP IN MICHIGAN
Have you been wondering why al I the ideas you learned in Economics I haven't
been working? Why the forecasts made at summit meetings of economists seem
to go wrong? Why the U.S. economy, in utter disregard of all the rules of
classical economics, suffers rising inflation and rising unemployment at the
same time?
Well, there are reasons. Reasons that establishment economists have not wanted
to face, and sti I I refuse to face, because the great myth of the last three
decades would then be exposed. The myth is that we are so rich, so productive
and so favored that we can have both a huge and growing military establishment
and simultaneously a healthy society replete with booming industry and all
the social services we need.
This myth, born of a brief experience, and nurtured by those whom it benefitted
has pervaded the American scene since 1945. People emerged from World War II
with this experience imprinted in their minds: Five years ago they were
standing in lines outside that said "No Help Wanted." The war came, some went
into the Army, some went to work in war production, but everyone went to work.
Moral: wars, or at least military spending, is aood for the economy.
A number of big companies learned something too. They learned that cost-plus
contracting is the businessman's bonanza. Just get that contract, and rake
it in. Cost-plus means you get a guaranteed profit. In fact, if the price
of overhead, materials, or labor goes up, you make even more money as Uncle
Sam--i.e. the U.S. taxpayer--not only will absorb the extra cost, but increase
your profits. A 10% profit on a $100 million contract is $10 million, but if
expenses go up and you have an overrun, 10% of $200 million is a profit of
$20 million.
The bin corporations which had been making record profits during the war were
loathe to get off the gravy train and go back into the more uncertain joys of
free enterprise, where you didn't always make money. In fact, sometimes you
lost it.
So, in 1948, the National Security Council, a small group of Presidential
advisors closely tied to the Pentagon, met and decided in secret that from then
on, into the indefinite future, 10% of the GNP should go to the Pentagon for
personnel and for arms production.
This momentous decision to allocate not a fixed sum of money, not a budgeted
amount, but a percentage of the GNP, was unique in American history. From
it have come many of the strains and the troubles this nation has experienced
in the three decades since World War II.
Since 1950, over two-thirds of the top technical and scientific talent of
the U.S. has worked for the Pentagon and its contractors. This drain upon
Civilian industry is one of the reasons why we have not fully developed
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alternative sources of energy, first-class high speed trains, and adequate
housing at reasonable costs. The people to do this research have been busy
elsewhere. They have been designing missiles, "smart" bombs, and flights to
the moon.
The economy could survive the strain of this drain-off of talent for some
years. We were the only major incustrial nation to emerge from the war in
1945 not only unscathed but with a newly tooled and booming industrial plant.
However, as the years passed and the Common Market nations plus Japan retooled
their plants, we began to meet even stiffer competition in world markets. We
became increasingly expert at building arms, while they were building ships,
trains and the whole array of civilian goods. It is no accident that when the
Shah of Iran was making his vast outlays, he bought military aircraft from
us, but an entire system of electrified trains from the French.
As federal taxes were being pulled in huge quantities from the industrial
states and, through military contracting and payrolls, redistributed to the
South and West, the Northeast, and Middle Atlantic and the Industrial Midwest
began to decline. M4ichigan, for instance, pays over $16 billion in taxes but
gets back only $9.6 billion in federal spending, a loss of $6.4 billion.
I
This means that $1,000 per person in the Detroit area is sucked off to Wash-
ington never to return in any form--social security, HEW, education--anything.
That money is gone, a net loss.
Even states as rich and productive as New York, Ohio, Michigan, and Illinois
cannot sustain this kind of loss decade after decade without showing signs
of the severest strain. The 1976 Detroit municipal budget deficit of $100
million is what the Pentagon takes out of Detroit every three weeks. And
Detroit is now suffering an unemployment rate of about 30%z.
The high taxes paid over the years and redistributed to the military and
hence to the Sun Belt states have also had depleting effects upon civilian
industries. They simply have not had enough money to reinvest.
3
Unable to buy the newest machinery and faced with the high wage demands of
American unions, many companies have moved their operations abroad to lower
wage areas, thus accelerating the decline of many cities. George Meany, an
unreconstructed Cold Warricr, instead of attacking the root problem, shouts
loudly for protective tariffs which no doubt would have the same salutory
effect on American industrial production the Smoot-Hawley tariff had in 1931.
The industrial depletion, closing factories, and declining income in civilian
industry has been inexorably followed by more poverty, anger and despair.
As job opportunities are reduced for the middle class, a sort of "bumping"
goes on in which college-educated young people drive cabs, wait tables, and
tend bars, thus disclacino working class young people to the unemployment lines.
But everyone isn't suffering equally. The states with large amounts of military
industry and huce military bases have been the beneficiaries of this redis-
tribution of taxes. Durina the years that Lyndon Baines Johnson occupied
the White House, the military contract going to Texas quadrupled from $1 billion
to $4 billion. Georcia, doubly blessed with Rep. Carl Vinson presiding over
the House Armed Services Committee and Sen. Richard Russell chairing the
Senate Armed Service Committee, is similarly dotted with bases and lucrative
contracts. A quick reference to the accompanying U.S. map will show which
states have been gaining money and jobs during these years.
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So, two big changes took place in the American economy between 1950 and
1975: the movement of capital and technical talent from the civilian sector
of the economy into the military sector; and the movement of tax money from the
industrial states of New England, the Middle Atlantic states, and the industrial
Midwest into a belt beginning with Virginia and going south and west to Calif-
ornia.
Strange economic symptoms have shown up during the past decade. Inflation,
historically low in the U.S. except in wartime, has risen to unprecedented
heights. Bouts with wage and price controls have been a little like giving
aspirin to a patient with pneumonia: the fever goes down temporarily and masks
the causes of the disease, whi le the patient's condition continues to deter-
iorate, The second system of a decaying economy-unemployment-remains stub-
bornly high in just those cities which once were Meccas for the poor of Europe
and the South.
The industrial depletion described above is one of the causes. The other
is the Defense Department budget itself. Spending money on the DOD has the unique
characteristic of simultaneously causing unemployment and inflation. Inflation
results because people are being paid to produce products which no one can buy.
After payday, workers in military factories go out and buy from the same stock
of food, housing, and medical care as do the rest of us. But their work has not
increased the common stock of needed goods and services. The prices for all these
items are therefore bid up--hence, inflation.
Spending money on the military causes unemployment because fewer jobs are
created for each billion dollars spent on the military than if the money were
spent in any other way.
Table I. Jobs Created Per Billion Dollars of Expenditure
4
If spent to create If spent to create
Jobs created by: jobs in industry Jobs in government
$I billion spent
in civilian sector 65,000 jobs 5  100,000 jobs
7
$1 billion spent
in military sector 55,000 .obs
6  79,000 jobs8
Jobs foregone by
spending on the
military 10,000 jobs 21,000 jobs
If money were taken out of military contracting and--either through a tax
cut or reallocation to other governmental programs--put toward civilian needs,
the nation's economy would benefit. Depending on exactly how the money were spent,
this could create at least 10,000 more jobs per billion dollars transferred and
Possibly 20,000 or more.
If instead of military contracts we reduced the number of armed forces
personnel, both civilian and military, and used the same money to hire more firemen,
teachers, state parks personnel, and other state and local government employees,
the economy would gain 21,000 jobs per billion dollars transferred.
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Thus, each billion dollars which has gone to the Pentagon over the years has
cost the economy a minimum of 10,000 jobs. The $104 billion Defense Department
budget requested by President Ford in 1976 will cost the economy over 1,000,000
jobs.
The combination of factors--the widespread acceptance of the myth that
military spending was good for the economy; the anxieties caused by the Cold War,
Korea, and Vietnam; and the symbiotic relationship of the military and its contrac-
tors--has allowed the rise of the Military-industrial Complex. Institutionalized
in the Pentagon, the CIA, the National Security Agency, and the armed forces
lobbying organizations, it grew and prospered virtually untouched and unmolested
until Vietnam.
President Johnson perhaps personified the hope and the contradictions of
mid-century America. Born poor, he ascended to the White House determined to do
something for the Blacks and the poverty stricken of our country. Yet the "machismo"
tendencies, which so often have led men to war, made it impossible for him to say
no to the advisors urging him into Vietnam, thus simultaneously destroying his
Great Society and his presidency.
Johnson could not or would not face the fact that he had to make a choice:
The Great Society or Vietnam. His deception extended even to his own advisors.
He never allowed Secretary of Defense McNamara to tell the Council of Economic
Advisors how much the war was costing. Their predictions, upon which much economic
policy was based, were erroneous. This, of course, exacerbated economic problems
then, and since.
By 1965, a considerable portion of the society had been co-opted either by
choice, by geography, or by economic circumstances into the Military-Industrial
Complex.
A number of unions with membership working in military industries could always
be counted on to plead vigorously for a continuation of their current contract
or to press for a new one. Military, management, and the unions were thus united
in their desire to continue and increase military spending. When a major portion
of a union is pleading for more contracts, it becomes difficult for the top
officers to lobby against the military budget as a whole.
This dilemma, combined with George Meany's well publicized support for every
type of military expenditure and venture, made most of the labor movement
quiescent until Vietnam.
Many academics were also silent. If you inquired you would find out that
a neighbor in the physics department had just gotten a nice DOD contract, or that
a social science department was hoping to get a little research money from the
Air Force. Presidents of great universities scrambled to get on the contract
gravy train, and then screamed when dumped off unceremoniously as the war in
Vietnam consumed all the available money.
However, enough of academia was either not getting much contract money, or
was touched by the anguish of their students being drafted to fight in a war
they abhorred. Many colleges and universities became major bastions of resistance
to the war in Vietnam. So the universites were only partially co-opted, but it
took Vietnam to jar them loose from their contract-fed complacency of the fifties
and mid-sixties.
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With cities and states, the splits became more evident every year.
Southern and many Western mayors are all for a continuation of high military
spending. The Northern and Midwestern mayors--faced with layoffs, unprecendented
deficits, and fiscal crises--finally, in 1976, passed a resolution saying that the
cities should get as much money as the Pentagon. Except for a occasional ideologue,
the split here is predictable: the mayors whose cities get the military money
think that the present arrangement is fine; those who don't want a change.
Members of Congress follow similar lines of thinking. Some, like Sen. Robert
Griffin of Michigan, or Sen. James Buckley of New York, will vote for every nickel
that the Pentagon wants no matter how much it hurts their states. Others, like
Proxmire of Wisconsin or Bayh of Indiana display a sustained and healthy skepticism
toward the voracious demands of the Pentagon. They realize that as the Pentagon
prospers, their states decline.
Let us examine briefly some big American institutions and their stands on
the Military-Industrial Complex.
Business has historically been sympathetic to Pentagon demands, although
many individual businessmen are not. The trade union movement is split with some
portions now aware of the military's economic stranglehold. Churches, except for
the historic peace churches and the actions of the main line denominations during
the Vietnam war, have remained largely quiescent.
The universities now contain a good many faculty members who came of age
politically during the events of the sixties, and who have a new and more realistic
view of the society. They do not, of course, form a majority of university
presidents, deans, or department heads. Most professional associations do not see
this as a big concern. However, the layoffs of teachers are becoming so severe
in many areas that the National Education Association and some local and state
teachers' organizations may be ready to move.
Congress is split. As in the early days of the Vietnam war, many more
Representatives and Senators are against a growing military than will vote against
it when appropriations time comes. There is not, however, the deep ideological
Cold War mentality that was so pervasive during the fifties and early sixties.
Key votes, such as on the B-I bomber appropriation, are now down to a 10 vote
margin in the House instead of 200 to 300 vote margins of a few years ago.
So where is the soft spot in all this armor? We may now be coming to an era
of new attitudes. A new look is needed at the budget of the Department of Defense,
that $100 billion annual bill that gets handed from the Pentagon to the White
House to the Congress to the American taxpayer. There is now skepticism about one
keystone to approving these monstrous sums year in and year out--the argument that
it created jobs, that it was good for the U.S. economy.
Two years ago, I found the facts to disprove this argument, to unmask it for
the myth it was, and to turn the tables on the contractors, the generals, and the
highly paid lobbyists who make so free with our tax money.
One day while reading the manuscript of a new book, I came across a statistical
regression analysis showing over a thirty-year period what happened to various
sectors of the economy when the military budget went up or down. Professor Bruce
Russett of Yale had done an analysis which showed the following:
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Table 2. Expenditures Foregone by Sector of the Economy
for each Billion Dollars Spent on the Military
$187,000,000 on services
163,000,000 on durable goods
128,000,000 on state and local government consumption
114,000,000 on residential structures
110,000,000 on producers durable equipment
97,000,000 on exports
71,000,000 on non-durable goods
68,000,000 on non-residential structures
48,000,000 on federal civil purchases
25,000,000 on imports
If Dr. Russett could show how much money was not spent (foregone) for these
sectors of the economy, it seemed that it might be possible, with a careful
methodology, to show how many jobs were foregone in each of these sectors. After
about nine months of work, we computerized the data and, at one a.m. on a freezing
Michigan February night, the MSU computer began to spit out the data, state by state.
Until we added up the totals on a state by state basis, we never knew whether
the Pentagon's spending created or cost more jobs in the nation as a whole. We
had factored in the pay of uniformed and civilian military personnel in each state,
and all the jobs created by military construction and military industry in each
state. We subtracted all the jobs lost in durable goods, non-durable goods, services
residential construction, nonresidential construction, and state and local government
as a result of tax money syphoned off to the Pentagon budget. So we ended up with
a net figure for the U.S., and for each of the fifty states.
We found that the military budgets of around $80 billion from 1968 to 1972
had cost the economy 844,000 jobs. Each additional billion dollars to the Pentagon
caused about 10,600 jobs to disappear. We also found that 60% of the population
live in states which suffer a net loss of jobs when the military budget goes up.
The results are even more dramatic when viewed regionally. The Middle Atlantic
and the East North Central states together lose over one ane one-quarter million
jobs. The Great Plains states lose. The South Atlantic and West Central states,
on the other hand, gain over one-quarter million jobs. I0
The state-by-state figures on net jobs foregone take on a more human meaning
when compared to their average employment during the years studied. For five of
the largest industrial states--New York, Illinois, Michigan, Ohio, and Pennsylvania--
the jobs foregone becuase of high Pentagon budgets averaged 85% of their total
unemployment between 1968 and 1972. This means that military spending had an
enormous impact upon their unemployment insurance costs, their welfare expenditures,
and the state services never provided because of a lowered tax base and higher
social welfare costs. The relationship of jobs foregone to unemployment in each
of the states which suffer a net loss of jobs is shown in table 4.
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Spending Annual Average,
State
1. New York
2. Illinois
3. Michigan
4. Ohio
5. Pennsylvania
6. Wisconsin
7. Indiana
8. New Jersey
9. Minnesota
10. Tennessee
11. Iowa
12. Massachusetts
13. Oregon
14. Florida
15. West Virginia
16. Nevada
17. Arkansas
18. Connecticut
19. Louisiana
20. Vermont
21. Nebraska
22. Idaho
23. Maine
24. Delaware
25. Wyoming
26. South Dakota
27. Missouri
28. Montana
29. Rhode Island
30. New Hampshire
31. Arizona
32. Maryland
33. Alabama
34. New Mexico
35. North Dakota
36. Kentucky
37. Kansas
38. Mississippi
39. Utah
40. Washington
41. Colorado
4Z. Alaska
4 . Oklahoma
44. North Carolina
45. South Carolina
46. Hawaii
47. Georgia
48. Virginia
49. California
50. Texas
UNITED STATES TOTAL:
1968-1972.
Number of Jobs Foregone or Gained
-426,000
-174,000
-172,000
-146,000
-127,000
- 72,000
- 57,000
- 53,000
- 47,000
- 40,000
- 37,000
- 35,000
- 33,000
- 23,000
- 22,000
- 15,000
- 12,000
- 9,000
- 9,000
- 4,400
- 4,200
- 4,000
- 3,800
- 1,000
- 1,000
- 100
+ 1,500
+ 2,000
+ 4,800
+ 5,500
+ 7,700
+ 8,000
+ 9,000
+ 10,000
+ 10,000
+ 14,000
+ 16,000
+ 17,000
+ 19,000
+ 2?,000
+ 25,000
+ 29,000
+ !2,000
+ 31,000
+ 36,000
+ 38,000
+ 55,000
+ 56,000
+ 97,000
+133,000
844,000 jobs.
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Table 4. Jobs Foregone as Percentage of T tal Unemployment.
Annual Average, 1968-1972.1
Average Number Jobs Foreqone
Number of of Unemployed as % of
State Jobs Foregone Persons Unemployment
New York 426,000 382,000 112%
1llinois 174,000 191,000 91%
Michigan 172,000 230,000 75%
Ohio 146,000 171,000 85%
Pennsy I van i a 127,000 207,000 61%
Wiscons i n 72,000 83,000 87%
Indiana 57,000 92,000 62%
New Jersey 53,000 175,000 30%
Minnesota 47,000 71,000 66%
Tennessee 40,000 68,000 59%
Iowa 37,000 41,000 90%
Massachusetts 35,000 143,000 25%
Oregon 33,000 50,000 66%
Florida 23,000 90,000 26%
West Virginia 22,000 41,000 54%
Nevada 15,000 14,000 107%
Arkansas 12,000 35,000 34%
Connecticut 9,000 83,000 11%
Louisiana 9,000 79,000 11%
Vermont 4,400 9,000 49%
Nebraska 4,200 19,000 22%
Idaho 4,000 15,000 27%
Maine 3,800 24,000 16%
Delaware 1,000 10,000 10%
Wyoming 1,000 6,000 17%
South Dakota 100 9,000 1%
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Of the 60% of U.S. citizens who live in states which suffer a net job loss,
the overwhelming majority of them live in highly industrialized states which do not
contain large military bases.
During the period studied, 1968-1972, most of the New England states were
net loss states. Only Rhode Island and New Hampshire showed slight gains. The
region as a whole lost about 42,000 jobs annually. This was true even when
Connecticut was getting heavy military contracts because of the Vietnam war, and
Massachusetts was getting substantial contracts for research and development.
In the Middle Atlantic region, every state lost, with New York losing more
jobs than any other state in the country--an astounding 426,000. New Jersey and
Pennsylvania lost heavily even though they received substantial military contracts
and both states host some military bases. The losses they sustained in civilian
industrial production, coupled with the very large number of jobs which they had
to forego in services and state and local government, resulted in 53,000 jobs
foregone in New Jersey and 127,000 in Pennsylvania.
The Great Plains states showed a more varied picture. Although the region
as a whole showed a net loss of 60,000 jobs, some states gained. The industrial
belt suffers the worst: 621,000 jobs were foregone in the East North Central
states of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin. This region, the
industrial heartland of the nation, showed a net loss of over 360,000 jobs just
in the industrial sectors rf its economy (durable and non-durable goods). With
relatively few military bases to compensate and a very substantial number of jobs
foregone in servic and state and local government, this region was the hardest
hit in the nation.
"i
The states which showed net gains in jobs from military bases and industry
form a geographic band which begins in Maryland and extends south to Georgia
(Florida is excluded), west to California (excluding Louisiana), and north to
Washington (omitting Oreqon).
The South Atlantic region, which includes Delaware, Maryland, Virginia,
West Virginia, and Florida, qained 142,000 jobs. Delaware, West Virginia, and
Florida lost jobs; the other states gained heavily. Virginia, North and South
Carolina and Georgia had almost 427,000 military personnel stationed within their
borders. Over 105,000 military personnel were living in Florida, but their presenc(
was not sufficient to overcome the large job losses in residential construction
and services.
Texas led the West routh Central section with a net gain of 133,000 jobs.
Texas was receiving an averaqe of $2.5 billion worth of military contracts
during these years, generatinq about 88,000 jobs a year. There were also 247,000
uniformed and civilian military personnel stationed there each year. Therefore,
Texas' net gain was large, the largest in the nation. Oklahoma also gained,
about 32,000 jobs. Arkansas, however, lost almost 12,000 jobs during each year
of the period studied.
Washington, with both troops and contracts, and Alaska and Hawaii, with
large military bases, were all net gain states. Only Oregon of the Pacific
Coast States lost jobs--33,000 of them.14
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It is important to analyze, both by state and overall, the totals by sector
of the economy.
Jobs Foregone by Sector of the Economy.
Annual Average, 1968-1972.
15
Gross Jobs Military
Sector Foregone Jobs Created Net
Durable Goods -796,000 +806,000 + 10,000
Non-Durable Goods -353,000 + 52,000 -301,000
Residential Construction -428,000 + 58,000 -370,000
Non-Residential Construction -253,000 + 11,000 -242,000
Services 
-1,528,000 
-1,528,000
State & Local Governm't -1,012,000 
-1,012,000
Jobs foregone in industry, services,
and state & local government: 
-3,443,000
Uniformed and non-uniformed
military personnel employed
in the United States. +2,599,000 +2,599,000
NET JOBS FOREGONE NATIONWIDE 
-844,000
Thus, the construction industry loses over 600,000 jobs when the military
budget is $80 billion. There are over 1,500,000 fewer jobs in services and over
1,000,000 fewer jobs in state and local government.
If a person lives in a net loss state and wishes to find out how many jcbs
a one billion dollar rise in DOD spending will cost4 simply take the net loss
figure for that state n the table and divide by 80 . For New York with a
426,000 job loss, the loss per billion dollars is 5,500 jobs. Thus President Ford's
demand for a $104 billion Pentagon budget will cost 146,000 more jobs in New York
state, or a total net loss of 572,000 jobs.
This data is, of course, politically significant. It can be used in a number
of ways. Senators, Representatives, mayors and candidates for public office
can all be asked before and after elections and on specific votes if they really
want to cost their own constituents jobs. Elected officials are very sensitive
to this. In preparation for testimony before the House Armed Services Committee
last winter, I did an analysis of the Congressional District of each member of
that committee who came from a net loss state. I found the following:
$80 billion was the average DOD budget for the years studied, 1968-1972.
Congressman
and
Party
Rep. Melvin Prince, D.
Rep. F. Edward Hebert, D.
Rep. Charles Bennett, D.
Rep. Samuel Stratton, D.
Rep. Lucien Nedzi, D.
Rep. Robert Mollohan, D.
Rep. Les Aspin, D.
Rep. Bob Carr. D.
Rep. Tom Downey, D.
Rep. David Treen, R.
Rep. George O'Brian, R.
Rep. Robin Beard, R.
Rep. Donald Mitchell, R.
Rep. Elwood Hillis, R.
Rep. Richard Schulze, R.
Location
and
State
E. St. Louis, Illinois
New Orleans, Louisiana
Jacksonville, Florida
Albany, Schenectady, N.Y.
Detroit, Michigan
Wheeling, Parkersburg, W. Virg.
Racine, Kenosha, Wisconsin
Lansing, Jackson, Michigan
Suffolk County, New York
New Orleans, Louisana
Chicago, Joliet, Illinois
Memphis, Clarksville, Tenn.
Rome, Utica, New York
Anderson, Marion, Indianapolis,
Indiana
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
Number of Jobs lost in
District Due to an $80
Billion Military Budget
7,800
1,200
900
8,600
10,300
6,500
7,100
8,300
9,800
800
8,200
4,900
9,500
5,000
4,900
I released these findings to the Washington press corps and to the Congress-
men's local newspapers cn the morning of my appearance. By the time I appeared,
many of the fifteen Congressmen had been inundated with calls from their hometown
newspapers, "Mr. Price, I understand that your votes are costing us 7,800 jobs
a year." Both incumbents and challengers have used similar analyses, based on
the data in my study, in electoral campaigns.
Governors and mayors from net loss states, if they understand this data, can
also be expected, even urged, to bring pressure on Congressional delegations to
vote against excessive military expenditures.
Unions whose members are suffering considerable unemployment are often
responsive when they understand the problem. Rank and file members want to know
the causes of their economic troubles, and are open to ways of curing them.
Most of the 1,500,000 member United Auto Workers, the constructions workers, the
ILGWU, teachers unions, and the many other non-military unions lose jobs because
of high Pentagon budgets. The nation's fastest growing union, AFCSME (American
Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees) has taken leadership in
educating its members and the public about this problem.
Union leaders are using this data to make three main points:
I) There is enormous waste in the military budget. There are more officers
now with a 2,000,000 member peacetime army than when we had in an II,000,000
member army during World War II. There is no need to increase the overkill.
Terminate cost-plus contracting--it makes a few executives rich and causes you to
be overtaxed.
2) We are overtaxed. All (yes, 100%) of the U.S. personal income tax between
1960 and 1974 went to the Pentagon. A federal tax cut would allow more income to
be voted for state and local taxes and to be spent by individuals as disposable
income. Both uses of the money would create more jobs.
3) We must have conversion legislation. This would simultaneously deprive
the Military-Industrial Complex of some of its most vigorous lobbyists--union
members who fear unemployment--would help the economy.
The responses on the part of union audiences have varied from warm to enthusi-
astic.
The mystique of the generals and of the Pentagon is gone, buried in the mud
and despair that was Viet Nam. The cities and the country are crying out for
change. The data which are presented can be used in homes, in union halls, in
elections, to destroy the keystone of the MIC. America is waking up to the
realization that billions for the Pentagon means millions of unemployed.
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